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Young children expect members of a familiar category to share nonobvious prop- 
erties. The present experiments were designed to determine whether children 
expect unfamiliar objects with the same novel label to share nonobvious proper- 
ties. In three experiments, 4-and S-year-old children were taught properties about 
unfamiliar objects (e.g., a gnu-like animal) and then were tested on their gener- 
alization of each property to four test objects. The test objects were either similar 
or dissimilar in appearance to the target and received either the same or a different 
novel label from that of the target. When category labels and appearances were 
completely independent of one another, children drew inferences based on ap- 
pearances rather than novel category labels. However, when the same pictures 
received familiar labels (e.g., a cow, a deer) instead of novel labels (e.g., a fep, a 
wug), children drew inferences based on category labels as well as appearances. 
Furthermore, children did draw inferences on the basis of novel labels when 
perceptual cues were not completely discrepant from the labels. These results 
suggest that novel labels help guide children’s inferences from unfamiliar catego- 
ries, but only when the conceptual basis of the names is clear. 
An important function of categories is to extend knowledge beyond what is 
known from direct experience or observation. That is, categories promote induc- 
tive inferences concerning nonobvious properties. For example, once we dis- 
cover that one bird has a right aortic arch, we can reasonably infer that other 
birds also have right aortic arches. Inferences such as these at times go beyond 
This research was supported by a University of Michigan Rackham Faculty Research Grant, a 
National Academy of Education Spencer Fellowship, and NICHD grant l-R29-HD23378 to S. 
Gelman. We thank Elise Brooks for her help in collecting data, and Marilyn Shatz, Ed Smith, Larry 
Barsalou, and Roberta Golinkoff for their helpful comments. We are grateful to all of tbe children, 
parents, and teachers who participated in the studies, including those of the following schools: Ann 
Arbor “Y” Children’s Center, Comtree Co-op Child Care Center, Early Learning Center, Law 
Montessori School, Peach Tree Pre-school Workshop, and the University of Michigan Children’s 
Centers. 
Correspondence and requests for reprints should be sent to Natalie S. Davidson, Department of 
Psychology, University of Michigan, 330 Packard Rd., Ann Arbor, MI 48104-2994. 
Manuscript received January 5, 1989; revision accepted September 20, 1989 151 
152 Natalie S. Davidson and Susan A. Gelman 
appearances, as when we .infer that a penguin and a robin share certain underly- 
ing similarities because both are birds, despite their surface dissimilarities. In a 
recent set of experiments, Gelman and her colleagues (Gelman, 1988; Gelman & 
Markman, 1986, 1987; Gelman & O’Reilly, 1988) found that children grasp this 
function of categories by the age of 3 years. That is, young children realize that 
familiar categories often share important properties that are not perceptually 
obvious. 
In order to determine whether children realize that category membership can 
be more important than perceptual cues in their inductive inferences, Gelman and 
Markman conducted several studies in which, for several different categories, the 
perceptual similarity of the objects was pitted against their category membership. 
The task involved teaching children new facts and then charting how they gener- 
alized the new information. For example, on one item, children were shown a 
triad of pictures consisting of a flamingo, a bat, and a blackbird. The experiment- 
er told the child, “This bird gives its babies mashed-up food” (pointing to the 
flamingo), and “This bat gives its babies milk” (pointing to the bat). Then the 
child was asked, “Does this bird (the blackbird) give its babies mashed-up food 
like this bird (the flamingo) or milk like this bat?” In this and other items, the test 
picture was labeled with the same category label as one of the first two pictures 
(e.g., both were called birds), but was perceptually dissimilar (e.g., the black- 
bird looked different from the flamingo). The test picture was similar in ap- 
pearance to the other one of the first two pictures (e.g., the blackbird resembled 
the bat) yet received a different label from it. The results showed that children 
consistently based their generalizations on the category membership of the ob- 
jects and not on their perceptual similarities. For example, in this case, children 
typically reported that the blackbird gives its babies mashed-up food like the 
flamingo, despite the striking similarity between the blackbird and the bat. 
Control conditions were included to rule out the possibility that children were 
basing their inductions on the identity of category labels rather than on the 
category membership of the objects. For example, children continued to draw 
inferences from one category member to another even when category members 
received synonymous rather than identical labels. 
Gelman and Markman’s finding is surprising in light of traditional develop- 
mental theories which would predict that children attend only to obvious percep- 
tual qualities of things (Wellman & Gelman, 1988). It also raises the question of 
what the basis is of children’s ability to look beyond the obvious on this task. 
HOW is it that children at such an early age, with little or no scientific training, 
can appreciate the importance of category membership for inductions? There are 
at least two distinct possibilities, representing two ends of a continuum. At one 
extreme, children’s beliefs in the rich structure of categories may be individually 
built up for each category. That is, children may need experience with and 
knowledge about a category before assuming that it promotes inductions. Chil- 
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dren may reason something like this: “I know that members of this category have 
many obvious properties in common, so they probably have many nonobvious 
properties in common, too.” For example, children rapidly learn that all or most 
birds have feathers, lay eggs, build nests, fly, have wings, make chirping sounds, 
and so forth. On the basis of these observed similarities, children may extrapo- 
late that birds are also likely to share less overt features (e.g., internal parts, 
parenting behaviors, diet). In other words, through their experience with specific 
categories, children may come to expect members of these categories to share 
deep similarities. If this is the case, then children will base their inductions on 
category membership only for familiar categories. 
At the other extreme, children may hold a general expectation about language 
that is independent of their specific experiences with a given category. Children 
may assume that objects with the same name share important, nonobvious prop- 
erties. This expectation could apply to novel objects and novel labels not pre- 
viously encountered. This latter possibility would be at least consistent with 
recent research, which has uncovered several early expectations that children 
have about the structure of natural language categories. For example, Macnamara 
(1982) claims that children as young as 18 to 24 months assume that a common 
noun refers to an object as a whole rather than to one of its properties. Moreover, 
children assume that a common noun picks out an entire category of objects 
whereas a proper noun refers to only an individual object (Gelman & Taylor, 
1984; Katz, Baker, & Macnamara, 1974). Children also have expectations about 
how categories encoded in language are organized. By 3 years of age, children 
assume that nouns refer to objects that are taxonomically related (e.g., a dog and 
a cat) even though in simple classification tasks in which no label is used they 
typically group objects on the basis of thematic relations (e.g., a dog and a bone) 
(Markman & Hutchinson, 1984; see Waxman & R. Gelman, 1986, for a related 
finding). 
The purpose of the present studies is to investigate which of the above two 
possibilities better characterizes why children draw category-based inferences. In 
particular, do children need extended experience with a given category before 
treating it as the basis of inductions, or do children hold a general expectation 
that objects with the same name share deep similarities, even for novel objects 
with which children have little specific experience? To examine this question, we 
looked at the role that language plays in children’s inductive inferences concem- 
ing unfamiliar objects. In the first experiment, we examined whether children 
make use of a novel label of an unfamiliar object in determining when to 
generalize one of its properties. In the second experiment, we examined the 
effect that children’s experience with a category had on their inductions. In the 
third experiment, we varied the structure of the category involved to determine 
whether children are more willing to draw inferences within some novel catego- 
ries than within others. 
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EXPERIMENT 1 
In this experiment, we investigated the importance of language for children’s 
inductions from unfamiliar categories using a task similar to that of Gelman and 
Markman (1986, 1987). However, rather than using familiar objects and familiar 
category labels (e.g., a bird), we used unfamiliar objects (e.g., a gnu-like ani- 
mal) and labeled them with unfamiliar terms (e.g., a zav). The task involved 
teaching children facts about a target object and then charting the extent of their 
generalizations of the fact to four test objects. The test objects varied in their 
relatedness to the target on two dimensions, category label and perceptual sim- 
ilarity. That is, two of the test objects were perceptually similar to the target 
while the other two looked quite different from the target. Moreover, the catego- 
ry labels of the two objects at each level of perceptual similarity were varied. One 
object at each level received the same label as the target and the other received a 
different label. In this manner, we were able to determine whether children base 
their inductive inferences on the labels of objects with which they have no prior 
experience. 
Method 
Subjects. Fifty-three children (27 girls and 26 boys) participated, recruited 
from a list of interested parents. The mean age of the children was 4;9, ranging in 
age from 4;3 to 5;3. In addition, 18 adults participated in a rating task to preselect 
the pictures (see the following). 
M&e&Is. Eight sets of pictures of unfamiliar objects were used, each set 
containing five objects from the same superordinate category. Four of the sets 
included natural kinds (mammals, reptiles, insects, and vegetables); the other 
four included artifacts (furniture, machines, measurement devices, and vehicles). 
Each set of pictures consisted of one target and four test pictures. %o of the test 
pictures looked very similar to the target, while the other two looked very 
different from it. The pictures were drawn in accord with several specific criteria. 
That is, the similar pictures differed from the target only in shade of color, 
position, and one salient feature (e.g., a different tail than the target’s). The 
dissimilar pictures differed from the target in several respects: color, position, 
size, coat or material (e.g., wood versus metal), and two to three other salient 
features. One of the picture sets is shown in Figure 1. 
Ad& Ratings. It was important to ensure that, for each pair of pictures, 
both pictures at a given level of similarity were equally similar to the target 
picture. For this reason, we asked 18 adult volunteers to rate the perceptual 
similarity of each test picture to the target, for 16 sets of pictures that had been 
drawn according to the criteria described above. The rating scale ranged from 1 
(“not similar at all”) to 7 (“extremely similar”). The final eight sets that were 
used in the study were chosen from these original 16 because they met the 
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I Conditions 
Novel Label Familiar Label Unrelated Objectsa 
Target Picture 
I . . G a zav a cow a zav 
Test Pictures 
I . w a zav a cow 
a traw a deer 
a zav a cow 





a A dillerent target picture was used in this condition (i.e.. a measuring instrument). 
Figure 1. The structure of each picture set for Experiments 1 and 2. 
following requirements: (a) The similar items were perceived as very similar to 
the target (i.e., the mean similarity rating of each picture was 5 or greater, with a 
mean total of 5.9), (b) the dissimilar items were perceived as very different from 
the target (i.e., the mean similarity rating of each picture was 3.1 or lower, with a 
mean total of 2.5), (c) the two similar items per set were equally similar to the 
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target (i.e., the mean difference between their similarity ratings was 0.45), and 
(d) the two dissimilar items per set were equally different from the target (i.e., 
the mean difference between their similarity ratings was 0.40). 
All of the properties taught to children in the study were simple attributes that 
the children could easily understand (see Table 1). They were modified from a 
collection of such attributes generated by adult subjects as ones typical of in- 
stances of these superordinate categories (Gelman, 1988, footnote 5, p. 73). 
Because the categories being tested were unfamiliar, and because the attributes 
could not be determined from the appearances of the pictures alone, children 
would be unable to use prior knowledge of these attributes in answering the 
questions. 
Procedure. All children were seen individually. Children were told that they 
would be shown some pictures of unfamiliar things and would be asked to help 
answer some questions about them. There were three conditions: the Novel Label 
condition (n = 20), the No Label condition (n = 16), and the Unrelated Objects 
condition (n = 17). 
Novel Label Condition. For each set, the experimenter showed the child the 
target picture and taught him or her a label for the object (e.g., “This is a zav”). 
The labels used were all nonsense words, including biv, bof, cheem, durn, fonr, 
jop, kif, lobe, lorse, prote, pume, rom, shap, sim, skub, thorp, traw, turp, vaw, 
vit, woj, wug. yub, and zav. These labels were randomly assigned to the pictures 
in the eight sets. The child also learned a property of the target (e.g., “This zav 
has four stomachs”). Then, the child was shown each of the four test objects, one 
at a time. For each of the four test pictures, the child learned a label for the object 
and was then asked whether he or she thought that the property learned about the 
target was also true of the test object [e.g., “This is a traw (test picture). Do you 
Table 1. Categories and Properties Used 










has four stomachs 
lives in trees 
eats bananas 
is good for your fingernails when 
you eat it 
uses electricity 
is used to hang shirts on 
is used to make tables 
is used to find lost pennies 
nWe did not use these category labels in the experiment. They 
are listed here to indicate that the pictures were intended to belong 
to these categories. 
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think this traw has four stomachs like this zav (target)?“]. One of the similar 
objects was labeled with the same label as the target (e.g., zav), and the other 
similar object received a different label (e.g., truw). Likewise, one of the dis- 
similar objects received the same label as the target (e.g., zav), and the other 
received a different label (e.g., pume). (A sample item with the novel labels is 
shown in Figure 1.) This procedure was repeated for each of the four test pictures 
in all eight sets. The order of presentation of the sets and the order of test pictures 
within each set was randomized for each subject. Also, the assignment of same 
vs. different labels to each member of a pair of pictures at the same level of 
similarity was counterbalanced across subjects. 
No Label Condition. The purpose of this control condition was to determine 
the separate effect of appearances on children’s inferences. Children were shown 
the same pictures as in the Novel Label condition, but were not taught any labels 
for them [e.g., ‘See this? Do you think this (test picture) has four stomachs like 
this (target)?“]. 
Unrelated Objects Condition. The purpose of this condition was to ensure 
that any effects we might find for labeling would not be due to a response bias 
(i.e., to answer “yes” whenever the target and test pictures had the same label 
and “no” whenever they were different), without any consideration of how 
plausible the inferences were for a given set of test pictures. In this condition, the 
procedure was the same as in the Novel Label condition, but the picture sets were 
designed so that the target was completely unrelated to the test pictures. This was 
accomplished by pairing a target picture from a natural kind category with a set 
of test pictures from an artifact category, and vice versa. For example, one set 
consisted of a mammal as the target object (such as the one in Figure I) and four 
measuring instruments as the test objects. Thus, on one trial children heard, “See 
this zav (pointing to one of the measuring instruments)? Do you think this zav 
has four stomachs like this zav (pointing to a mammal)?” 
Results and Discussion 
If children expect objects that receive the same label to share important novel 
properties, then we would expect them to show a tendency to draw inferences on 
the basis of the category labels in our task. ’ That is, they should more often draw 
inferences when the label of a test object matches that of the target than when the 
labels do not match. For example, children should draw more inferences when 
asked, “Do you think this zav has four stomachs like this zav?” than when they 
are asked, “Do you think this traw has four stomachs like this zav?” On the other 
hand, if children base their inferences strictly on the appearances of objects, they 
I It is not clear from the current studies whether this tendency would be due to a bias that children 
have to interpret category labels in this way or to a constraint on the interpretations that they consider 
(see Keil, 1981; Nelson, 1988). 
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should draw an equal number of inferences to both of the test pictures at each 
level of perceptual similarity to the target. 
Each child scored a “1” every time he or she drew an inference from the 
target to the test picture, that is, every time he or she answered “yes.” Since 
preliminary analyses showed no significant sex differences, sex was not included 
as a factor in subsequent analyses. A four-way ANOVA was performed on the 
total scores for each test picture, calculated across all eight sets. Condition 
(Novel Label vs. No Label vs. Unrelated Objects) was the between-subjects 
variable, with repeated measures on category type (natural kind vs. artifact), 
appearance (similar to target vs. dissimilar), and label (same as target vs. differ- 
ent). (Note that the appearance factor does not apply to the Unrelated Objects 
condition since all pictures in that condition were dissimilar from the target in 
appearance.) Within each cell of this design, a subject’s score could range from 0 
to 4. Results are shown in Figure 2. There were five significant results. 
First, there was a main effect for condition, F(2.50) = 8.69, p < ,001. 
Children drew significantly fewer inferences in the Unrelated Objects control 







l Same Label 




Figure 2. Mean percentage of inferences as a function of picture and condition: 
Experiment 1. [Pictures did not receive labels in the No Label condition, so ap- 
pearance is the only relevant dimension for that condition. The target picture in the 
Unrelated Objects condition was from a diRerent category (e.g., a target picture of a 
mammal was paired with four test pictures of measuring instruments), so all of the 
test pictures in that condition were dissimilar in appearance from the target. The bar 
labels “SA” and “DA” refer to “Similar Appearance” and “Dissimilar Ap 
pearance,” respectively.] 
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62%), r(35) = 4.12, p < .002, or the No Label condition (M = 54%), ~(31) = 
2.92, p < .Ol. This result indicates that children rarely made cross-category 
inferences even when the labels matched exactly. Thus, children are sensitive to 
how plausible the inference would be in making their responses. In an additional 
r test it was found that there was no significant difference between the Novel 
label and No Label conditions. 
The second significant result was that children drew more inferences to the 
test pictures that were perceptually similar to the target (M = 55%) than to those 
that were perceptually dissimilar from the target (M = 37%), as shown by a main 
effect for appearance, F( 1,50) = 44.12, p < .OOOl. There was also an Ap- 
pearance x Condition interaction, F(2,50) = 7.90, p < .Ol. This result was due 
to the absence of an appearance effect for the Unrelated Objects condition, as 
predicted. 
Finally, category type was found to have two significant effects on children’s 
inductions. First, children drew significantly more inferences to artifacts (M = 
49%) than to natural kinds (M = 43%), F(1,50) = 13.72, p < .001.2 However, 
this result must be interpreted in light of an Appearance X Category Type 
interaction, F(1,50) = 4.60, p < .05. Appearance had a larger effect on the 
inductions that children made for the natural kinds than it did for the artifacts. 
The mean difference between the number of inferences made to pictures of 
similar appearance to the target and the number made to pictures of different 
appearance from the target was 21% for the natural kinds and only 14% for the 
artifacts. 
The type of label that a picture received did not affect the number of in- 
ferences children drew. In the Novel Label condition, for pictures similar in 
appearance to the target, there was no significant difference between the number 
of inferences drawn to the test objects with the same label as the target (M = 
76%) and those with a different label (M = 72%). The same was true of pictures 
dissimilar in appearance from the target (M = 49% for both kinds of pictures). 
Thus, children did not use labels as the basis of their inferences for these novel 
objects. Rather, children appeared to be using appearances exclusively. 
There are at least two possible explanations for the previous result. First, 
children might require experience with a category before they set up expectations 
about the inferences they can draw from it. All of the pictures and labels in the 
Novel Label condition were ones with which children had no experience. 
2 This result is somewhat surprising, given recent findings that, Forfamiliar categories, natural 
kinds generally promote more inferences than artifact categories (Gelman. 1988; Gelman & O’Reilly, 
1988). Perhaps the natural kind-artifact differences Found previously were partly a result of sub- 
jects’ experience with, and knowledge about, actual natural kinds and artifacts. However, it is also 
important to realize that in the present study neither the properties taught nor the complexity of the 
objects included were equated across category type. Thus, the category type differences obtained here 
should be viewed with caution, and may not generalize to a different set of items. 
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However, there is another possible explanation. To explain, we first point out 
that the Novel Label condition provided a very strong test of children’s under- 
standing that labels imply deep similarities. For every set, the target and one test 
picture differed substantially in their appearance yet received the ~anre label, 
while the target and another test picture were highly similar in appearance yet 
received dQj%rent labels. Children may have been unable to understand how an 
object that looked like the target could be a member of a different category, while 
an object that appeared different from the target was in the same category. Some 
minimum amount of similarity (perceptual or otherwise) may be necessary be- 
fore children accept a common noun label. This could be a particularly serious 
problem with novel labels, about which children have minimal information. 
Thus, the labels in Experiment 1 may not have made sense to our subjects 
because they violated children’s expectation that things with the same name are 
deeply alike. Thus, the names could have been ignored. But if objects were 
labeled in a way that made sense to children on a conceptual level, with labels 
that were more consistent with their expectations, perhaps children would use the 
labels as clues to induction. 
In the following experiments, we examined the preceding possible explana- 
tions for our results. In Experiment 2, we examined the effect that children’s 
experience with a category has on their inductions. In Experiment 3, we labeled 
the pictures more closely in accord with children’s nonlinguistic understanding. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
In the second experiment, we investigated more explicitly the effect that experi- 
ence with a category has on children’s inductions. Rather than include only 
unfamiliar categories (as in Experiment l), we compared children’s inferences 
within familiar and unfamiliar categories directly. More specifically, we varied 
how familiar the category labels were to the children by using either familiar 
labels (e.g., a cow) or unfamiliar labels (e.g., a zav) for the same set of pictures. 
We then charted the extent of children’s inductions to the test objects in order to 
determine whether children would draw more inferences within categories that 
were familiar than within categories that were unfamiliar. 
Method 
Subjects. Thirty-three children (18 girls and 15 boys) participated in the main 
experiment. The mean age of the children was 4;8, ranging in age from 4;l to 5;4. 
In addition, 12 children (4;l to 5;2, mean age: 4;s) participated in the pretest (see 
the following). None of these children had participated in Experiment 1. 
Mate&. The same pictures were used in this experiment as in the pre- 
vious one. All of the properties taught about the targets were simple attributes 
that children could easily understand. 
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Procedure. All children were seen individually. Children were told that they 
would be shown some pictures of unfamiliar things and would be asked to help 
answer some questions about them. There were two conditions: the Novel Label 
condition (n = 16) and the Familiar Label condition (n = 17). 
Novel Label Condition. The task for this condition was the same as that in 
the Novel Label condition of Experiment 1. For each picture set, the experiment- 
er showed the child the target picture and taught him or her a label for the object. 
The same nonsense words were used as in Experiment 1. However, in this study, 
since the labels for the Familiar Label condition could not sensibly be assigned to 
the pictures randomly, the labels for the Novel Label condition, rather than being 
randomly assigned, were fixed for each picture as well. Only the initial assign- 
ment of labels to each set was random. Within each set, the type of label used for 
a picture (i.e., either the same or different from the target’s label) was held 
constant across the two conditions. 
Each child learned a property of each target picture (e.g., “This zav has four 
stomachs inside”). He or she was then asked, for each of the four test pictures, 
whether the property learned about the target was also true of the test picture 
[e.g., “This is a traw (test picture). Do you think this traw has four stomachs 
inside like this zav (target)?“]. This procedure was repeated for each of the four 
test pictures in all eight sets. The order of presentation of the sets and of the test 
pictures within each set was randomized for each subject. 
Familiar Lube1 Condition. The only difference between this condition and 
the Novel Label condition was the use of real words that children would know for 
the labels in the Familiar Label condition. These included cow, deer, giraffe, 
dinosaur, lizard, frog, spider, grasshopper, caterpillar, onion, corn, pineapple, 
spaceship, submarine, car, hanger, television antenna, chair, coffeemaker, saw, 
mixer, clock, camera, and lamp. The words were assigned to the pictures so that 
they were all unusual but plausible members of these familiar categories. That is, 
the primary characteristics of each picture were consistent with those of its 
corresponding familiar object. All objects were drawn to have the correct mate- 
rial (e.g., the lizards had scales; the saws appeared to be made of metal; the deer 
had fur), to have parts that were consistent with those of their familiar counter- 
parts (e.g., the cows had hooves; the car had tires; the submarine had a per- 
iscope), and to have approximately the same shape as their familiar counterparts 
(e.g., the pineapple was short and squat; the giraffe was tall and lean; the camera 
was a square box sitting on a tripod). 
For example, one of the target pictures was of a gnu-like animal with an 
elephant’s trunk and was labeled a cow (“See this cow? This cow has four 
stomachs inside.“). Just as in the Novel Label condition, each child was asked 
whether the property taught about the target was also true of the test picture [e.g., 
“This is a deer (test picture). Do you think this deer has four stomachs inside like 
this cow (target)?“]. 
Pretest of Properties. It was important to ensure that children did not al- 
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ready know the properties when asked about the familiar categories. For this 
reason, it was necessary to change several of the properties that would otherwise 
be too familiar to children. We then pretested all of the properties to make certain 
that the final set included ones that children did not already know. We showed 11 
children all of the test pictures, one picture at a time, and labeled each with the 
category label it would receive in the Familiar Label condition. When each 
picture was shown, the child was asked whether or not it had the particular 
property of interest (e.g., “This is a coffeemaker. Do you think this coffeemaker 
has batteries inside?“). The final set of eight properties was chosen to include 
ones that children did not already know. For these properties, there was no 
significant difference between the number of “yes” responses to the test objects 
that would be labeled the same as the target (M = 32%) and the number to those 
that would be labeled differently from it (M = 3 1%). The final set of properties is 
shown in Table 2. 
Results 
A child scored a “ 1” every time he or she drew an inference from the target to the 
test picture. Since preliminary analyses showed no significant sex differences, 
sex was not included as a factor in subsequent analyses. A four-way ANOVA was 
performed on the total scores for each test picture, calculated across all eight 
sets. Condition (Novel Label vs. Familiar Label) was the between-subjects vari- 
able, with repeated measures on category type (natural kind vs. artifact), ap- 
pearance (similar to target vs. dissimilar), and label (same as target vs. different). 
Results are shown in Figure 3. There were four significant results. 
Table 2. Categories and Properties Used in Experiment 2 










cow, deer, giraffe 
lizard, dinosaur, frog 
grasshopper, spider, cater- 
pillar 
onion, corn, pineapple 
spaceship, submarine, car 
hanger, TV antenna, chair 
saw, coffeemaker, mixer 
clock, camera, lamp 
has four stomachs inside 
lives in sand 
eats raisins 
is good for your fingernails 
when you eat it 
is made of steel 
has wires inside 
has batteries inside 
has a motor inside 
OWe did not use these category labels in the experiment. They are listed 
here to indicate that the pictures were intended to belong to these categories. 
These are the labels used in the Familiar Label condition. The labels used 
in the Novel Label condition are listed in the text under the Novel Lube/ 
Condirion heading in Experiment 1. 
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Similar 
n Same Label 








W Same Label 
0 Different Label 
Figure 3. Mean percentage of inferences as a function of picture and condition: 
Experiment 2. 
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First, as in Experiment 1, there was a main effect for appearance, F( 1,3 1) = 
32.94, p < .OOOl. Children drew significantly more inferences to test pictures 
that were perceptually similar to the target picture (M = 71%) than to those that 
were perceptually dissimilar from the target (M = 56%). 
Second, there was a Label X Condition interaction, F( 1,31) = 4.48, p < .05. 
ln the Familiar Label condition, children showed a nonsignificant tendency to 
draw more inferences to objects labeled the same as the target (M = 62%) than to 
those labeled differently (M = 54%). In contrast, in the Novel Label condition, 
children showed a nonsignificant tendency to draw fewer inferences to objects 
labeled the same as the target (M = 68%) than to those labeled differently (M = 
72%). Using the Novel Label condition as a baseline, this result suggests that 
children were more likely to use a familiar-word category label for their induc- 
tions than an unfamiliar one. As in Experiment 1, children did not assume that 
unfamiliar labels were informative with respect to induction of novel properties. 
Third, children made more inductions to artifacts (M = 69%) than to natural 
kinds (M = 59%), as indicated by a main effect for category type, F(1,31) = 
14.66, p < .OOl. Since we did not control for the types of properties used across 
the two category types, it is possible that the properties of the artifacts and the 
natural kinds were not equally generalizable at the outset of the experiment. This 
possibility is supported by the fact that this difference between artifacts and 
natural kinds was also found in the pretest of the properties. Children responded 
“yes” more often when asked whether a particular artifact had the property of 
interest (M = 39%) than when asked the same of a natural kind (M = 24%). 
Accordingly, this difference probably does not indicate anything very general 
about children’s beliefs about differences in the inductive power of natural kind 
versus artifact categories. 
The final significant result was a Label X Category Type interaction, F( 1.31) 
= 5.86, p < .05. For the natural kind categories, children tended to draw more 
inferences to objects labeled the same as the target (M = 63%) than to those 
labeled differently (M = 55%). In contrast, for the artifact categories, children 
tended to draw fewer inferences to objects labeled the same as the target (M = 
66%) than to those labeled differently (M = 71%). However, neither of these 
pairwise comparisons was significant. 
Discussion 
In the Novel Label condition of Experiment 2, as in Experiment 1, we found that 
children did not base their inductive inferences from unfamiliar objects on the 
novel labels (e.g., zav, rruw) that the objects received. However, when the very 
same unfamiliar objects were given familiar names (e.g., cow, deer; Familiar 
Label condition of Experiment 2), children showed more of a tendency to use the 
labels as the basis of induction. Although there was no significant difference 
between the number of inferences to pictures with the same versus different 
labels from the target in either condition, the Label X Condition interaction 
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suggests that knowledge of a category label increases its power in guiding induc- 
tive inferences. However, simply hearing a label for an object is not always 
sufficient to signal to a child whether or not the category is richly structured and 
promoting of inductions. Children may in fact require a certain amount of experi- 
ence with that label; they may need to observe that objects with that name have 
many other similarities in common, before the label reaches the status of guiding 
inductions. In more concrete terms, just knowing that two animals are both 
called zavs does not imply that they have any further commonalities above and 
beyond what one would assume based on their appearances. But knowing that 
zavs eat the same food, live in the same habitat, are pursued by the same 
enemies, react similarly to fear, etc., could lead a child to expect that any two 
zavs will share many further properties as well. 
EXPERIMENT 3 
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrate that children do not hold a 
completely general assumption about language, in which objects with the same 
name necessarily share deep similarities whereas objects with different names 
have different underlying natures. However, this finding does not necessarily 
imply that children’s understanding of the power of language for induction is 
built up for every category individually. That is, children may not always require 
direct or extended experience with a word in order to use it as the basis of 
induction. 
We suggest that children may hold an expectation about language that is more 
directly related to the structure of the category being named. This expectation has 
two parts: (a) When children are unable to see the conceptual basis of a novel 
label-that is, when they fail to see what objects with the same new name have 
in common-they will not use the label to guide their inductions. This is what 
we found in the Novel Label condition of Experiments 1 and 2. In those experi- 
ments, the novel labels were too discrepant with how children divided up the 
objects based on appearances, and the label was not used as the basis for induc- 
tions. (b) In contrast, when children are able to detect the conceptual basis of a 
novel label-when they see that objects with the same new name share important 
similarities-they will use the label to guide their inductions. That is, if the 
novel label is fairly consistent with children’s nonlinguistic partitioning of the 
objects under consideration (e.g., based on their appearances), then children may 
believe that the label maps onto a richly structured category and may tend to draw 
inferences based on the label. 
In the present experiment, we tested the preceding notion indirectly by provid- 
ing children with the same pictures as in Experiments 1 and 2, but showing each 
child only three of the pictures per set. In particular, one of the “conflict” 
pictures in each set was omitted (either the one of similar appearance but a 
different label from the target, or the one of dissimilar appearance but the same 
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label). In this way we hoped to reduce the contradiction between the labels and 
the child’s nonlinguistic (perceptual) partitioning of the pictures. Note that label- 
ing still provides information beyond that of appearances (i.e., there is still a 
conflict between appearances and labeling). However, children should find it 
easier to grasp the conceptual basis of a set with one anomalous instance, than a 
set with two anomalous instances that run counter to one another. 
Method 
Subjects. Seventy-four children (39 girls and 35 boys) participated in the 
experiment. The mean age of the children was 4;10, ranging in age from 4;0 to 
5;9. None of these children had participated in Experiments 1 or 2. 
Materials. The same pictures were used in this experiment as in the two 
previous ones. However, in this experiment children saw only three test pictures 
from each set rather than four, as in Experiments 1 and 2. Two separate configu- 
rations of three test pictures per set were each presented to two groups of 
children, so that children’s patterns of inferences to all four test pictures from 
Experiments 1 and 2 could be determined. 
The design of the two configurations was identical, except for the nature of 
one of the pictures in each set. Both configurations included the following two 
kinds of pictures: (1) Similar Appearance-Same Label (SASL) pictures. (These 
pictures were similar in appearance to their respective targets, and also received 
the same label as the target.) (2) Dissimilar Appearance-Different Label (DADL) 
pictures. (These pictures were markedly different in appearance from the target, 
and received a different label from that of the target.) Finally, the third picture in 
each set posed a conflict between appearances and labeling. In one configura- 
tion, the third picture was similar in appearance to the target but received a 
different label from that of the target. [This configuration will be referred to as 
the Similar Appearance-Different Label (SADL) set; an example of this configu- 
ration is shown in Figure 4.1 In the other configuration, the third picture was very 
different in appearance from the target but received the same label. [This config- 
uration will be referred to as the Dissimilar Appearance-Same Label (DASL) set. 
An example of this configuration is shown in Figure 5.1 
The purpose of this design was to determine the number of inferences that 
children would draw to the two conflict pictures individually relative to the 
number they draw to the two pictures that pose no conflict. In each of the 
configurations-the Similar Appearance-Different Label configuration and the 
Dissimilar Appearance-Same Label configuration-comparison of the conflict 
picture with one of the no-conflict pictures will show whether labels affect the 
number of inferences children draw, while comparison with the other no-conflict 
picture will show whether there is an appearance effect. 
There were no individual properties taught about the targets in this experi- 
ment. Instead, the same general question was asked about the test objects in all 
the categories, namely, “Do you think this (test object) and this (target object) 
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Conditions 
Novel Label Familiar Label 
Target Picture 
a zav a cow 
Test Pictures s I*. 






Figure 4. The structure of each picture set for the Similar Appearance-Different 
Label configuration: Experiment 3. 
have the same kinds of stuff inside?” This change from the properties used in 
Experiment 2 was included in an attempt to reduce the role of individual vari- 
ability in children’s knowledge about particular properties, and to shorten the 
task. Previous research (Gelman & O’Reilly, 1988) has found that preschool 
children tend to attribute identity of internal parts primarily to members of the 
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Conditions 
Target Picture 
Novel Label Familiar Label 
a zav a cow 
Test Pictures 
Figure 5. The structure of each picture set for the Dissimilar Appearance-Same 
Label configuration: Experiment 3. 
same basic-level category (e.g., all dogs are thought to have “the same kind of 
stuff inside,” whereas dogs and horses are less often thought to do so). 
Procedure. All children were seen individually. Children were introduced 
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homeland far away. They were asked to help the experimenter answer some 
questions about them. 
There were three conditions: the Novel Label condition (n = 23, the Familiar 
Label condition (n = 23, and the Novel Label with Information condition (n = 
24). Each condition was completed with an approximately equal number of 
children who saw the Similar Appearance-Different Label picture configuration 
and the Dissimilar Appearance-Same Label configuration. 
Novel Label Condition. The task for this condition was similar to that in the 
Novel Label condition of Experiment 2. For each picture set, the experimenter 
showed the child the target picture and taught him or her a label for the object. 
The same nonsense words were used as in Experiments 1 and 2. The child was 
then asked, for each of the three test objects in that set, whether the test object 
and the target have the same kind of stuff inside [e.g., “This (test object) is a 
traw. Do you think this traw and this zav (target) have the same kind of stuff 
inside?“]. This procedure was repeated for each of the eight picture sets. The 
order of presentation of the sets and the order of test pictures within each set was 
randomized for each subject. 
Familiar Label Condition. As in Experiment 2, the only difference between 
the Novel Label and the Familiar Label condition was the use of real words that 
children would know in the latter condition. The same words were used as in 
Experiment 2. Just as in the Novel Label condition, each child was asked 
whether the test object and the target have the same kind of stuff inside [e.g., 
“This (test object) is a deer. Do you think this deer and this cow (target) have the 
same kind of stuff inside?“]. 
Novel Label with Information Condition. The only difference between the 
Novel Label condition and the Novel Label with Information condition was that 
children were taught a property of the target category in the latter condition [e.g., 
“Here’s a zav (target animal). Zavs eat bugs,” or “Here’s a durn (target artifact). 
Durns are used to carry people underwater.“]. The purpose of the extra sentence, 
in this case “Zavs eat bugs” or “Durns are used to carry people underwater,” was 
to provide information about the category as a whole, beyond just the label. We 
hypothesized that the extra information might help children realize the structure 
of the category and therefore help them to draw inferences on the basis of the 
novel label. The new information always concerned some important charac- 
teristic of the category as a whole (e.g., habitat, diet, form of locomotion). The 
presentation of the test pictures and the subsequent questions were the same as in 
the Novel Label condition [e.g., “This (test object) is a traw. Do you think this 
traw and this zav (target) have the same kind of stuff inside?“]. 
Results 
Each child scored a “ 1” every time he or she drew an inference from the target to 
the test picture, that is, every time he or she answered “yes.” Analyses were 
performed separately for the Similar Appearance-Different Label set and the 
Dissimilar Appearance-Same Label set. 
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Figure 6. Mean percentage of inferences as a function of picture and configuration: 
Experiment 3. 
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Similar Appearance-Different Label Set. A three-way ANOVA was per- 
formed on the total scores of each test picture, calculated across all eight sets. 
Condition (Novel Label vs. Familiar Label vs. Novel Label with Information) 
was the between-subjects variable, with repeated measures on category type 
(natural kind vs. artifact) and picture type [Similar Appearance-Same Label 
(SASL) vs. Similar Appearance-Different Label (SADL) vs. Dissimilar Ap- 
pearance-Different Label (DADL)]. Results are shown in Figure 6. 
There were no main effects or interactions due to labeling condition. Chil- 
dren’s inferences were roughly equal across the three conditions (41%, 44%, and 
52% overall in the Novel Label, Familiar Label, and Novel Label with Informa- 
tion conditions). Furthermore, category type had no effects on the number of 
inferences children drew (48% overall to natural kinds, 44% overall to artifacts). 
The only significant result was a main effect for picture type, F(2,68) = 3 1.71, 
p < .OOOl. In particular, there were significant effects of both labels and ap- 
pearances on the number of inferences that children drew. When appearance was 
held constant, children drew significantly more inferences to test objects with the 
same label as the target (Picture SASL: M = 65%) than to those with a different 
label (Picture SADL: M = 47%), p C .02. Furthermore, when labeling was held 
constant, children drew significantly more inferences to test objects that were 
perceptually similar to the target (Picture SADL: M = 47%) than to those that were 
perceptually dissimilar from the target (Picture DADL: M = 25%), p < .Ol. 
Dissimilar Appearance-Same Label Set. A separate three-way ANOVA 
was performed on the total scores of the children who were shown this set of 
pictures. Condition (Novel Label vs. Familiar Label vs. Novel Label with Infor- 
mation) was the between-subjects variable, with repeated measures on category 
type (natural kind vs. artifact) and picture type [Similar Appearance-Same Label 
(SASL) vs. Dissimilar Appearance-Same Label (DASL) vs. Dissimilar Ap- 
pearance-Different Label (DADL)]. Results are shown in Figure 6. 
The results were similar to those of the Similar Appearance-Different Label 
set. There were no significant main effects or interactions due to condition. The 
number of inferences drawn in the Novel Label, Familiar Label, and Novel Label 
with Information conditions were 43%, 50%, and 47%, respectively. As before, 
category type did not affect the number of inferences children drew (46% overall 
to natural kinds, 46% overall to artifacts). 
There was a significant main effect for picture type, F(2,68) = 48.92, p C 
.OOOl . Again, there were significant effects of appearance and of labeling. When 
labels were held constant, children drew significantly more inferences to test 
objects that were perceptually similar to the target (Picture SASL: M = 70%) 
than to those that were perceptually dissimilar from the target (Picture DASL: M 
= 41%), p < .Ol . Furthermore, when appearances were held constant, children 
drew significantly more inferences to test objects with the same label as the target 
(Picture DASL: M = 41%) than to those with a different label (Picture DADL: M 
= 28%), p C .05. 
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Discussion 
In Experiment 3. children drew inferences based on novel labels as well as 
familiar labels. This result contrasts with the results of Experiment 2, in which 
children showed a tendency to draw inferences based only on familiar labels. 
What could account for the difference in results between Experiments 2 and 
3? We suggest that the primary difference was in the structure of the picture sets 
that were presented. Recall that in Experiment 2, names were totally orthogonal 
to appearances for the two conflict pictures. That is, the name provided no clue 
to an object’s appearance. For this reason, we propose that in Experiment 2 
children were unable to see the conceptual basis of the novel labels. Without any 
further information about the categories being named, children may have been 
unable to understand how one object in a set could be similar in appearance to the 
target but have a different label, while another could be dissimilar in appearance 
but have the same label. However, in Experiment 3, there was only one such 
anomalous picture per set in which the label and appearance were discrepant. 
Therefore, children were able to understand how the labels mapped onto the 
pictures, because the structure conveyed by the labels was not too discrepant with 
children’s own nonlinguistic, perceptual partitioning of the objects. 
It is also possible that the different results across experiments could be due 
partly to the different properties taught across the different experiments. In Ex- 
periments 1 and 2, children were taught a specific property of one member of a 
category, and their inductions of that property to other objects were then tested 
[e.g., “Do you think this traw (test picture) has four stomachs inside like this zav 
(target)?“]. In Experiment 3, however, children’s inductions of a general proper- 
ty about the target were tested (e.g., “Do you think this traw and this zav have 
the same kind of stuff inside’?“). Children could be more willing to infer that two 
members of a category have the same internal structure than that they share the 
more specific properties of Experiments 1 and 2. 
However, it is unlikely that the preceding difference in procedure could ac- 
count entirely for the different results. Gelman and O’Reilly (1988) have also 
tested children’s inductions of specific properties in one experiment, and their 
beliefs about internal structure in the other (“Do these have the same kinds of 
stuff inside’?“), and have generally found the same patterns of results in both 
experiments, with a high level of inferences drawn to members of familiar 
categories. Furthermore, the specific properties used in Experiment 2 are. in 
principle, capable of promoting inductions, since they did evoke category-based 
inferences in the Familiar Label condition. Similarly, many of the specific prop- 
erties used in Experiments 1 and 2 are strictly analogous to properties that were 
used in earlier studies that also evoked category-based inductions from familiar 
categories. For example, “eats raisins” is analogous to “eats alfalfa” (Gelman, 
1988), “eats grass” (Gelman 8c Markman, 1987), and “eats plants” (Gelman & 
Markman, 1986). Thus, there appears to be nothing about the properties per se 
that would limit children’s inferences in Experiments I and 2. Rather, the pri- 
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mary difference among the experiments appears to be the structure of the picture 
sets that children saw. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Young children consider category membership to be at least as important as 
perceptual cues in guiding their inductive inferences within familiar categories 
(Gelman & Markman, 1986, 1987). The purpose of the current studies was to 
consider two possible hypotheses in order to explain the basis of children’s 
unexpectedly early appreciation of the role of categories. The first hypothesis we 
examined is that children may need specific experience with a category label 
before they expect members of that category to share deep, nonobvious proper- 
ties. Their knowledge of the many, more obvious properties that category mem- 
bers share (e.g., that birds have beaks and feathers, and typically fly) might lead 
children to assume that category members also share other less obvious proper- 
ties (e.g., that birds have the same kind of heart, bone structure, and diet). In 
contrast, the second hypothesis is that children may not require specific experi- 
ence with a category before they assume that it promotes inductions. Instead, 
they may hold a general assumption about language, such that all objects with the 
same name are assumed to share important, nonobvious properties. 
We tested these two hypotheses in a series of three experiments. The major 
difference between the current experiments and previous research (Gelman & 
Markman, 1986, 1987) was in the familiarity of the objects used. Gelman and 
Markman (1986, 1987) used familiar objects with familiar labels (e.g., a rabbit, 
snake, pearl, etc.), while the current studies used novel objects (e.g., a gnu-like 
animal with an elephant’s trunk) with novel labels (e.g., a zav). The use of novel 
objects allowed us to separate the effect of labeling from the effect of children’s 
familiarity with the objects being labeled. This design provided a better test of 
whether the category-based inferences children demonstrated in Gelman and 
Markman’s (1986, 1987) studies were due to children’s early appreciation of a 
general principle of language, or to their knowledge of other similarities that 
members of familiar categories share. 
There are two primary findings from the current studies. First, children do at 
times draw inferences on the basis of novel labels for unfamiliar objects, even 
when such labels conflict with perceptual appearances. Specifically, in Experi- 
ment 3, children who saw pictures of novel animals and objects drew signifi- 
cantly more inferences when labels matched than when they differed, regardless 
of whether the labels were familiar or novel. In this case, the labels provided 
infomlation to children above and beyond the perceptual information from the 
pictures alone. Thus, children have at least a somewhat general assumption about 
language, namely that objects with the same common noun label share deeper 
underlying similarities. 
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On the other hand, the second finding shows that children do not always draw 
inferences on the basis of a novel label (Experiments 1 and 2). This is actually an 
important finding in its own right, because it helps rule out the possibility that 
children in earlier studies (e.g., Gelman & Markman, 1986, 1987) were simply 
answering on the basis of category labels per se. Indeed, Experiments I and 2 
clearly show that children do not blindly draw inferences from one object to 
another just because they have the same name. 
When were labels important? In the present studies, labels gained importance 
in either of two ways: (a) Past experience (in the foml of a familiar basic-level 
label) could convey that the category in question was one that promotes induc- 
tions. This was suggested in Experiment 2, in which the very same pictures were 
labeled with either familiar (e.g.. a CON) or novel (e.g., a ZNV) labels. In that 
experiment, children drew inferences partly on the basis of the labels when the 
pictures received familiar labels, but on the basis of only appearances when they 
received novel labels. The familiar labels, therefore, seemed to provide informa- 
tion about the structure of the category in a way that the novel labels did not. (b) 
The structure of the category itself was also important. When labels did not 
completely contradict appearances, as in Experiment 3, children were willing to 
draw inferences based on the novel label. 
Altogether, then, children do not have a completely general assumption about 
the power that language has for conveying the deeper identity of novel objects. 
Instead, it appears that language guides children’s inductions in only a limited set 
of cases. In particular, children seem to base their inductions on the category 
only when they are able to understand how (or why) the category labels map onto 
the pictures in the way that they do. Experiments 1 and 3 used exactly the same 
pictures, but it was only in Experiment 3 that children drew inferences based on 
the category labels. Apparently, children were evaluating the entire set of objects 
that were named when deciding when to draw inferences. It may be that children 
were computing a value of “conceptual coherence” (Medin & Wattenmaker, 
1987) among objects that received the same name, which was then used to 
determine whether a category promotes inductions. However, at this point the 
notion of coherence is entirely unspecified, and more research is needed to 
detemline what goes into creating conceptual coherence. Developmental re- 
search may be particularly helpful in illuminating the notion, because children 
may have special difficulty learning incoherent categories. These difficulties 
could then help specify what makes a category coherent or not. Regardless of 
whether a satisfactory account of coherence can be constructed, our main point 
here is that the effectiveness of language interacts with other factors such as the 
structure of the category being named. 
Our findings and the preceding interpretation fit well with a range of related 
data. To begin with. Billman (1988) and Shipley (1988) have also recently found 
that labeling can influence the inductions that people make. Bilhnan gave adults 
an induction task with unfamiliar categories and found that subjects assumed that 
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novel labels provided important information. Importantly, in her study, ap- 
pearances did not conflict with category labels; rather, appearances were neutral 
with respect to category membership. Similarly, Shipley gave preschool children 
an induction task with categories which were somewhat unfamiliar, and also 
found labeling effects. Significantly, the structure of her items was like the 
Similar Appearance-Different Label sets in our Experiment 3. That is, there was 
only moderate discrepancy between labels and appearances. 
The suggestion that conceptual structure and not language alone is important 
to induction also helps make sense of recent findings by Gelman and O’Reilly 
(1988). In their study of familiar categories, language had no effect on children’s 
inductive inferences. Preschoolers and second graders drew just as many basic- 
level inferences without basic-level labels [e.g., “Do you think this (a soft, 
stuffed armchair) has lignin all through it like this (a straight-back wooden 
chair)?“] as they did when the basic-level labels were explicitly mentioned [e.g., 
“Do you think this chair (armchair) has lignin all through it like this chair 
(straight-back chair)‘?“]. Moreover, at the superordinate level, preschoolers were 
not able to make the appropriate within-category inductions even with the help of 
the labels [e.g., “Do you think this piece of furniture (a bed) has lignin all 
through it like this piece of furniture (a straight-back chair)?“]. Older children 
drew more superordinate-level inductions regardless of how the pictures were 
named. Thus, these results suggest that children were able to invoke the appro- 
priate basic-level categories for familiar objects on their own. However, for 
categories that were conceptually more difficult, such as superordinates, children 
did not benefit from hearing the categories explicitly mentioned. Apparently, 
some conceptual understanding of the category was necessary, above and beyond 
linguistic information, for children to draw category-based inductions. 
Similarly, Mervis (1984) has suggested that children will not reorganize a 
category based on language alone if the label does not have a conceptual basis 
that the child can understand. She has found that, even if a parent repeatedly 
corrects a child’s naming error (e.g., pointing out to a child that a goose is called 
a goose, not a duck), the child continues to make the naming error until he grasps 
the conceptual basis of the name. Her findings on word learning with very young 
children (approximately 14 months of age) are fully consistent with our findings 
on induction with children who are a few years older. 
In sum, our results and those of other investigators suggest that children have 
neither an entirely genera1 assumption about language, nor do they build up their 
expections about categories one at a time. Rather, they have a moderately general 
assumption that gets overridden when the structure of a category is inconsistent 
with how it is named. In future work it will be important to determine what the 
experiences and underlying mechanisms are that transform a word from being 
unfamiliar and able to promote inductions in only limited cases (e.g., a zav), to 
being familiar and able to promote inductions across a broader range of circum- 
stances (e.g., a cow). 
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